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NEWS INSIGHT Did Clinton's team fumble END-GAME in Kinshasa? by Chido Nwangwu (An abridged copy of this article appeared Wednesday May 14, 1997 in the editorial opinion page 35A of the HOUSTON CHRONICLE) With Laurent Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic(?) Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire entrenched in power across that country while still jostling for power with former prime minister Etienne Tshisekedi in the emerging social, economic and political architecture of the new Democratic Republic of the Congo, a few points regarding the journey to this moment in that country's history need be put in fresh, recent perspective. Simply, for the reason of not allowing more recent developments to becloud our proper, contextual recall of the movements of history and the dynamics of events that saw to the booting of Mobutu, one of the world's worst despots. A critical, defining juncture in the quest to oust Mobutu occured when the parties to the Zairean conflict failed to meet on Wednesday May 14, 1997. The reason? Kabila refused to show claiming "security concerns and personal safety." He knew he had Mobutu on the ropes while the discussions about how to define the future of that country were being made against the background of the shattering staccato of gunfire. But what started as a bold signal from U.S President Bill Clinton to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wazabanga, all but asking the dictator to quit the presidential palace at Mont Ngaliema in Kinshasa, seemed to have been be turning into a fumbled end-game in the long-drawn power-play without saints. Neither Mobutu nor the rapidly conquering ADFL's leader Laurent Kabila had the markings of a democrat. But of all who had battled the wily, indecently wealthy, disgraced, autocrat and presidential kleptomaniac in that land of over 45 million people, it was Kabila who inflicted the most consequential damage, shattering at once, the delusions of inevitability and idolatorous exertion of self by Mobutu . At the time (May 14, 1997), I asked and attempted a few answers to these question on the editorial opinion page 35A of Houston's only daily newspaper, Houston Chronicle in an article titled "U.S must boot Mobutu for sake of Zaire and Africa": What should the U.S do? How was the Clinton administration, mistakenly, fumbling an end-game that should be made to work better to the mutual interests of Zaireans and Americans? First, the recent views expressed on PBS on Friday May 9, and on CNN's Inside Edition with Frank Sesno on Sunday May 11, 1997 by Clinton's personal envoy managing the conflict in Zaire and current U.S ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson on the way forward for Zaire seemed, in my opinion, to indicate a misreading of the interests of Zaireans especially the cascading turn of events and on-going battle for Zaire's future.
Among other beliefs, Richardson said
the Clinton administration has been working to: Second, the fundamental flaw in the administration's handling of the end-game in Kinshasa was that continuing dangerous notion that post-Mobutu Zaire and protection of U.S strategic and short-term interests lie within the remnant of Mobutuism and the quasi-adminsitrative operations he ran in the guise and name of "The Government of the Zaire." Granted he was a Central Intelligence Agency zombie for over two decades, he does not belong to America's future and the long-term interests of Zaireans/Congolese. The military and political activities in the final weeks of April and early May 1997 in such areas as Kivu, Kwilu, Kisangani, Kwango, Shaba, Lubumbashi, Kasese, and soon, Kinshasa, against Mobutu ought not leave any pragmatist or diplomat under any illusions that Mobutu did not deserve any dignified exit. Unfortunately, Clinton's versatile personal emissary was appearing to millions of Zaireans and other Africans, especially members of the African diplomatic corps as working among other goals to provide the foreign policy equivalent of ensuring a negotiated and non-embarrasing exit for Mobutu. But Zaireans are no fools. According to Francesco Bamboko, owner of the only professional polling firm in that transforming country Zaireans-Congolese are not only fed up with Mobutu but those who are identified as his backers, collaborators or chaperons. Hence, Clinton's envoy, ambassador Richardson, a savvy deal maker in politics must know there are issues where the only deal at hand is no deal! For example, although the specifics of the issues are different, former president George Bush did not seek "a dignified exit" for Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The point was made, loud and clear, and neccesarily so, with lethal, blinding force that "aggression will not be rewarded!" It was not. Mobutu needed to be dealt a similar card for decimating the economy and fortunes of Zaire-Congo. Mobutu, and his thugs must be made pariahs, not definers at the table for Zaire's future as Richardson suggested. They should face the consequence for sentencing that once promising country to economic damnation and social squalor while erecting grandiose architectures of deviousness and systematized thievery. Third, with the stakes for Zaire's last opportunity for national renewal so stark and the geometry of ithe zones of relative power of Belgium and France (colonial and neo-colonial overlords of Zaire) deconstructing to U.S advantage, I believe the U.S. should not sit, again, at the wrong side of Zaire's future and history through self-inflicted policy, is judgements and arrogations. Lest we forget, despite his heady indulgences as the emerging generalismo, Kabila cannot seriously rebuild his country without international capital, especially, the U.S dollar.
Why? Current pragmatic interest? They will seek U.S corporations to redirect the investments profile of Congo-Zaire. From diamonds to copper and chromium, a dozen other precious minerals, and energy-related and explorations interests, Zaire holds economic value for Houston firms and other U.S companies. Plus, Zaireans are placing the English language at par with French. Why muddle the movement against all Mobutu stood for? Fourth, the Clinton administration blew an opportunity with the Mobutu end-game to send a clear message to other dictators and privileged thieves in government inside the African continent that the "new world order" specifically Clinton's "bridge to the future" is not an amoral, fanciful, international formulation entirely indifferent to the values of responsible, ethical, accountable and representative government. The U.S could have utilized Mobutu and Zaire's future to deliver a very strong signal, actively rejecting any and all dictatorial and corrupt regimes who inflict havoc on the continent's economy through state-sponsored assaults on the civil, economic, cultural, legal and human rights of their citizens. Or does what I called and summarized as "Clinton's Africa" (see USAfrica magazine, September 1993) merely seek transitions to quasi-democratic governments inside African countries with minimal and expedient regard for blatant abuse of human rights, economic despoliation, and in some cases, slaughter of whole ethnic communities by the likes of Mobutu? 'Clinton's Africa' should encompass a set of higher moral purposes in the democratizing of Africa into the 21st century? This is very important because Clinton will be president till the year 2000. And, for the avoidance of any doubt, in raising the issue of the moral component of U.S global leadership, I do not call for the U.S to become the equivalent of moral officers for Africa and its governments. No; although Moubutu is also partly the creation of the U.S., the French and chiefly Belgian security services and governments. Regardless, governments are moral instruments, ab initio, unless made dormant and indifferent by its leaders. The constitution of the U.S and other declarative principles by its founding fathers emphasize the moral intent and purpose of presidential power, domestically and internationally. The challenge, therefore, is that the U.S should desist offering cover, tacit or operational cushioning, for those leaders in Africa, such as Mobutu, who (mis)conduct public business as they do their private fiefdoms and playpens. Worse, their commander-in-chief mannerisms are only fit for barnyard events instead of presidential palaces. Fifth, the U.S government was confusing an unconditional removal of Mobutu from office with support for Kabila (as president). Not quite. I share the concern that Kabila will be inclined to authoritarian preferences to rebuild the country. But he cannot be more powerful than Mobutu, buddy of North Carolina Republican senator Jesse Helms and Rev. Pat Robertson's. The same structure of opposition which stayed at home defiantly in what they called "journess mortes", marched on the streets, refused to pay taxes to Mobutu and others who paved the path for Kabila will be countervailing forces. The U.S should reach out to them also. For example, former prime minister Etienne Tshisekedi holds credible international worth. Although he seems to have been snubbed by Kabila in his announcements of cabinet officers May 23, 1997. Sixth, if the remaining confederacy of dictators in that continent are made to believe they will get a Mobutu-type exit and gentle handling from Washington, they will loot their country's treasury with greater, unpunctuated impunity while continuing their murder of members of the opposition and jailing journalists for telling the naked emperor his clothes have become food for the termites his greed bought to dinner. Or is the White House not concerned about the values of an ill-educated soldier who earned less than $100 a month 32 years ago to catapult his personal fortune to well over $5 billion from Zaire's resorces? The arithmetic is simple: the chairman of the board (Mobutu) is extremely wealthy and luxuriating in indecent opulence but the corporation (Zaire and its shareholders) have become sorry metaphors for financial anemia and grinding poverty. What to do in Zaire-Congo? At the time (May 14, 1997), I suggested the U.S and the international community: 1) Abandon the "face-saving" game-plan. 2) Lure Mobutu into a zone of false safety. 3) Zaireans/Congolese should try him for his economic and human rights crimes (in court or in absentia) as an instructive prelude to their march into a risky future; hopefully, a better one, away from a battered past, sullied by the violent greed and megalomanaical autographs of Mr. Mobutu. 4) Aggresively work with Zaireans/Congolese and other investors, regional and international corporations to widen the base of an enterpreneurial middle class committed to free market economics in the Congo.
5) The real "process" of accountability and popular, elected, democratic
government, or a semblance of it, will begin to rise like the phoenix
from the ashes and ruins following Mobutu's 32-years of brutal, predatory
milking and privatizing of the resources of that country. That will,
truly, shatter the egotistical and frozen sense of imperial grandeur, a
putrid grandeur built on withering sands of avarice and delusional
inevitability by Mobutu.
The question in Kinshasa during those transformative weeks may be put thus:
will the Clinton administration rise to this important challenge of history
and assist Zaireans/Congolese find their rightful place in the comity of
progressive nations? Today, the issue is will Kabila rise to the challenge
of the moment and recreate with his compatriots a Congo that is great in
the imagination and realities of the people of that once great home of
late Patrice Lumumba? *Nwangwu is the Founder & Publisher, USAfrica The Newspaper, USAfrica Moneywatch, USAfricaonline.com, Digital Media Networks. copyright © May 1997 Back to: News Index, or USAfrica Homepage |